Truthmaker semantics has roots in the situation semantics of Barwise and Perry and, going back further, in the logical atomism of Russell and Wittgenstein. Both deal in worldly entities — situations, facts, or states of affairs — more specific than entire possible worlds.
The defining feature of truthmaker semantics is its exact treatment of conjunction, on which conjunction-truthmakers differ from conjunct-truthmakers. The former are fusions of the latter. This feature was noticed by van Fraassen (1969) and built into a metaphysical theory by Rodriguez-Pereyra (2005).
Truthmaker semantics proper begins with Kit Fine’s semantics for counterfactuals (2012), intuitionistic logic (2013), and the logic of containment (2016). Fine’s theory of content (2017a, 2017b) provides an analysis of propositions, subject matter, and partial content.
